Four Issues in Auctions and Market Design

R. Preston McAfee

Abstract


Market designs concerns creation of transaction rules, effectively an automated intermediary. I extend the work of Vives (1998), finding that, for moderately sized auction markets, coordination is more important than strategic behavior in determining efficiency. Second, with Cournot competition, small firm send to win auctions of licences (right to compete) tend to have inefficient outcomes. Finally, I describe on-going work to design selling mechanism for the purpose of extracting surplus when there is only one buyer.

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