Invirtiendo en Entrenamiento General: El Programa de FormaciÃ³n Dual
AbstractIn the Human Capital Theory developed by Becker (1964) firms have no incentives to provide general training unless workers are willing to finance it. In this paper, we argued that under certain conditions (either asymmetric information or strategic complementarity between general and specific training) firms are willing to pay for general training. Using data from the Chilean apprenticeship program, which consists on a joint educational program between schools and productive firms under which students spend a fraction of their time in the firms and a fraction on formal education, we cannot reject the hypothesis that firms pay for general training.
How to Cite
Balmaceda, F., & Sevilla Buitron, M. P. (1). Invirtiendo en Entrenamiento General: El Programa de FormaciÃ³n Dual. Economic Analysis Review, 16(2), 137-153. Retrieved from https://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/10
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