Investing in General Training: The Dual Training Program

Authors

Keywords:

general training, human capital, apprenticeship, asymmetric information, Chile

Abstract

In the Human Capital Theory developed by Becker (1964) firms have no incentives to provide general training unless workers are willing to finance it. In this paper, we argued that under certain conditions (either asymmetric information or strategic complementarity between general and specific training) firms are willing to pay for general training. Using data from the Chilean apprenticeship program, which consists on a joint educational program between schools and productive firms under which students spend a fraction of their time in the firms and a fraction on formal education, we cannot reject the hypothesis that firms pay for general training.

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Author Biography

Felipe Balmaceda, Universidad Alberto Hurtado

Programa de Postgrado en Economía, ILADES/Georgetown University. Universidad Alberto Hurtado

References

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Published

2001-10-31

How to Cite

Balmaceda, F., & Sevilla Buitron, M. P. (2001). Investing in General Training: The Dual Training Program. Economic Analysis Review, 16(2), 137–153. Retrieved from https://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/10

Issue

Vol. 16 No. 2 (2001)

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2001 Felipe Balmaceda, Maria Paola Sevilla Buitron

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

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