Concesiones de Carreteras: Recomendaciones para el Caso Peruano
Abstract
The purpose of this work is to present some recommendations regarding the concession of roadways to take place in Peru in the coming years. The Road Systems Concessions Program's scheme comprises the granting of approximately 7.000 km of roadway.
Two of the methods used to define the auction variable are analyzed. Minimum Toll (fixed term), and Least Present Value of Income (variable term). Auction Theory is utilized and, on this basis, an auction mechanism is designed. In this sense the proposal includes: a) the auctioning in the first place, of the most profitable systems in a sequential manner, the objective being that both the auctioneer and the concessionaire companies may master the process. b) The auctioning of the systems, by way of a closed-envelope by turns auction. c) The simultanous auctioning, of those road packages where the benefits granted by synergies present are superior to organizational costs; in this case the participants may make simultaneous offers for various road segments under concession. In this manner, advantage can be taken of possible scale economies, and market concentration will be limited.
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