Problemas de Coordinación y Delay en la Entrada a Acuerdos Avanzados de Integración

Natalia Pecorari

doi:10.4067/S0718-88702015000100002

Authors

Natalia Pecorari CONICET– Universidad Nacional del Sur, Departamento de Economía, Bahía Blanca.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-88702015000100002

Keywords:

Integration Agreements, Entry Model, Coordination, Game Theory, Cooperation, Delay

Abstract

In this paper we model the incentives and coordination problems related to the entry into advanced integration agreements (i.e. Economic and Monetary Union) by applying dynamic coordination games. We assume a set of candidate countries to join the agreement and analyze the coordination failures that prevent the realization of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, which implies that all countries enter in the first period of the game given that no gains from delay exist. We conclude that one way to achieve the secondbest equilibrium, which minimizes delay, requires that a subset of countries cooperate to join the agreement in the first period of the dynamic game, becoming therefore a dominant strategy for the rest to enter a period later.

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