Regulador No Benevolente y Asimetrias de Informacion. Aproximacion con un Modelo de Agencia
Keywords: Benevolent regulator, optimal prices, information asymmetries, incentive compatibility, participation constraint
AbstractThis document presents a theoretical model of a non-benevolent regulator and cost heterogeneous operators where the objective function to be maximized, besides considering consumers’ and producers’ surpluses, includes rent seeking from at least one of the operators that directly benefits the regulator. Under these conditions, the resulting regulatory contract complies with individual rationality and incentive compatibility; however, it introduces distortions that affect the most efficient operators resulting in costs to society as a whole. The main results from this model point towards the need to evaluate the relevance of maintaining regulation under such settings.
How to Cite
Espinoza Vasquez, L. M., & Rubin de Celis Cedro, R. (2017). Regulador No Benevolente y Asimetrias de Informacion. Aproximacion con un Modelo de Agencia. Economic Analysis Review, 32(1), 23-46. Retrieved from https://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/542
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