Institutions and Development in Mexico. Are Formal Economic Reforms Enough?
Keywords:
legislative coalitions, property rights, institutions, economic reform, presidential systemAbstract
This paper examines whether the current political arrangements framing the Mexican politics help in consolidating and advancing those economic reforms that have been implemented in Mexico since the 1982 severe economic crises. I will argue that these arrangements create impediments to the co-ordination required to sustain and advance those policy changes that are needed under the new economic model. Formal and informal institutional environments that do not provide for the adequate enforcement of political exchanges also generate high transaction costs. Politicians will have to design complex mechanisms to protect their rent allocation. Many political transactions will not be implemented, and those that may be so will tend to generate relatively inefficient public policies. The capability of the political system to enforce the new economic rules as well as property and other legal rights is also weak. As these factors play a key role for the allocative efficiency of markets and, consequently, for growth and development, the paper concludes that formal macroeconomic and structural reforms in economic sectors may not be enough.Downloads
References
Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Endogeneus political institutions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 565–611.
Alston, L., Melo, A., Müller, B., & Pereira, C. (2006). Political institutions, policymaking processes and policy outcomes in Brazil. Working Paper R-509. Inter-American Development Bank, Research Network.
Anglade, C. (1994). Democracy and the rule of law in Latin America. In: I. Budge and D. McKey (eds.), Developing Democracy, London: Sage Publications, 233–254.
Ayala, J. (2003). Instituciones para mejorar el desarrollo. Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Bardhan, P. (2006). Institutions and development. In: D. Clark (ed.). The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, Edward Elgar Publishing, 332–356.
Carpizo, J. (1978). El presidencialismo mexicano. Siglo XXI.
Casar, M. A. (1999). Las relaciones entre el poder ejecutivo y el legislativo: El caso de México. Política y Gobierno, 6: 83-128.
Clague, C. (1997). The new institutional economics and economic development. In: C. Clague (ed.), Institutions and Economic Development. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1997). Institutions and economic performance: Property rights and contract enforcement. In: C. Clague (ed.), Institutions and Economic Development. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Cox, G., & Mc Cubbins, M. (1998). The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes. Second Annual Conference. International Society for New Institutional Economics, Paris, France.
De la Madrid, M. (1998). El ejercicio de las facultades presidenciales. Porrúa.
Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review, 57(2), 347–59.
Dixit, A. K. (1996). The making of economic policy. The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4391.001.0001
Greif, A. (2005). Commitment, coercion, and markets: The nature and dynamics of institutions supporting exchange. In: C. Ménard and M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer, 727–86.
Greif, A. (2006). Institutions and the path to the modern economy. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511791307
Haggard, S. (2000). Interest, institutions, and policy reform. In: A. Krueger (ed.), Economic Policy Reform. The Second Stage. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hernández, R. (1998). Presidencialismo y elite en el cambio político de México. Política y Gobierno, 5(1), 197–224.
Jones, M. P. (1995). Electoral laws and the survival of presidential democracies. University of Notre Dame Press. https://doi.org/10.1353/book.147213
Katz, I. (2004). Marco institucional y desarrollo económico en México. Economía, Sociedad y Territorio, Dossier Especial, 33–64.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1999a). Aggregating governance indicators. Policy Research Working Papers, 2195. Washington: World Bank.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1999b). Governance matters. Policy Research Working Papers, 2196. Washington: World Bank.
Keefer, P. (2003). All democracies are not the same: Identifying the institutions that matter for growth and convergence. Paper presented at the Conference Successes and Failures of Real Convergence, National Bank of Poland.
Keefer, P. (2004). What does political economy tell us about economic development—and vice versa? World Bank, Washington, D.C. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3250
Keefer, P., & Knack, S. (1995). Polarization, property rights, and the links between inequality and growth. Working Paper 153. IRIS.
Linz, J. (1994). Democracy, presidential or parliamentary: Does it make a difference? In: J. Linz and A. Valenzuela (eds.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 3–70.
Loaeza, S. (1999). El partido acción nacional: La larga marcha. 1934-1994. México, FCE.
Mainwaring, S. (1993). Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy. Comparative Political Studies, 26(2), 198–228. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414093026002003
Mainwaring, S., & Soberg Shugart (eds.), M. (1997). Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
Mendez de Hoyos, I. (2003). Competencia y competitividad en México 1977-1997. Política y Gobierno, 10(1), 139–182.
Meyer, L. (1992). Las presidencias fuertes: El caso de la mexicana. Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 13, 55–71.
Molinar, J. (1991). El tiempo de la legitimidad: Elecciones. Autoritarismo y Democracia en México. México, Cal y Arena.
Moreno, A. (1999). Ideología y voto: Dimensiones de competencia política en México de los noventa. Política y Gobierno, 6(1), 45–82.
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139172493
Ros, J. (2004). El crecimiento económico en México y centroamérica: Desempeño reciente y perspectivas. Serie Estudios y Perspectivas 18. CEPAL, Sede Subregional México.
Shirley, M. (2005). Institutions and development. In: C. Ménard and M. Shirley, Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer.
Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). Presidents and assemblies. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173988
Spiller, P. T. (2003). The institutional Foundations of public policy: A transactions approach with application to Argentina. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19(2), 281–306. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewg012
Stepan, A., & Skach, C. (1994). Presidentialism and parliamentarism in comparative perspective. In: C. Linz and A. Valenzuela (eds.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Valenzuela, A. (1989). Chile: Origins, consolidation and breakdown of a democratic regime. In: L. Diamond, J. Linz y S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in developing countries: Latin America. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 191–248.
Weldon, J. (1997). The political sources of presidencialismo in Mexico. In: S. Mainwaring, and M. Soberg Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2006 Manuel Palma-Rangel
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Article usage
- ViewsTimes this article's page was opened since the journal started recording statistics. One person can visit more than once.
- 1,117
- DownloadsTimes the full text of this article (usually the PDF) was opened or downloaded.
- 2,420
All time, as recorded by the journal.
Among the top 1% by views · last 2 yearsCompared with all the journal's articles by views in the last 2 years, this one is among the top 1%.
Last 2 years: 1,001 views, 240 downloads.
2.17 downloads per view (journal average 1.65).Downloads of the full text for every abstract view of this article, compared with the whole journal.
Explore the journal's metrics
