The Industrial Organization of Congress in USA and Spain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
AbstractThe institutional and organizational details framing legislative processes are key aspects for understanding how Congresses work. From a new institutional economics perspective, this paper comparatively examines how the Spanish and USA Congresses are organized. The main purpose of the paper is to unveil the so-called “black box” factors operating in each case. The role played by property rights, hierarchy, individual deputies, leadership, transactions costs and committees will be researched. Whereas committees and decision-making rules based on a property rights system are key factors for understanding how the Congress performs in USA; in the Spanish case the most relevant explanatory factors are strong party leadership and the hierarchical rules by which political parties and parlamentary groups are organized.
How to Cite
Caballero Miguez, G. (1). The Industrial Organization of Congress in USA and Spain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis. Economic Analysis Review, 21(2), 105-123. Retrieved from https://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/64
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