Privatization and Regulation in Latin America
Keywords:
regulation, privatization, public policy, institutional framework, competition policy, developing countriesAbstract
Currently, one of the most active fields in microeconomics is the Economics of Regulation and one of the distinctive features of this dynamism is that it has occurred both at the theoretical and empirical level. However, the main reason why regulation has become a major topic in the present situation of developing countries, and particularly in Latin America, are its implications for public policy. This is a consequence of the fact that the initial implementation of many of these developments have occurred in countries that recently underwent deep processes of restructuring and redefinition of institutions. This paper argues that the quality, effectiveness, and scope of regulation are determined in a very fundamental way by the institutional framework where it is applied. More specifically, key elements of the institutional setting are: property (whether it is public or private), the legal framework, the availability of alternative instruments for regulation and the general framework given by competition policies.Downloads
References
Averch, H., & Johnson, L. (1962). Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint. American Economic Review, 52(5), 1052–1069.
Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J. C., & Willig, R. D. (1982). Contestable markets and the theory of industry structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Braeutigam, R. (1989). Optimal policies for natural monopolies. In R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (Cap. 23). https://doi.org/10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02011-x
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
Contreras, B., & Salas, F. (1995). Natural gas distribution regulation. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Del Sol, P., & Pérez, M. A. (1995). Economies of scale and tarification in the Chilean power sector. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
De Soto, H. (1989). The other path: The invisible revolution in the Third World. Harper and Row Publishers.
Demsetz, H. (1968). Why regulate utilities? Journal of Law and Economics, 11(1), 55–65.
Engel, E. (1995). Consumer protection policies and rational behavior. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Galal, A., & Nauriyal, B. (1995). Regulation in telecom in developing countries: Outcomes, incentives, and commitment. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Grossman, S., & Hart, O. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691–719. https://doi.org/10.1086/261404
Harberger, A. (1954). Monopoly and resource allocation. American Economic Review, 44(2), 77–87.
Karst, K., & Rosenn, K. (1984). Law and development in Latin America.
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1993). A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. MIT Press.
López-de-Silanes, F., & Zamarripa, G. (1995). Deregulation and privatization of commercial banking. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Newberg, J. (1994). Mexico's new economic competition law: Toward the development of a Mexican law of antitrust. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 31.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511808678
Paredes, R. (1996). Políticas de competencia en países sin tradición de mercado: El caso de Chile. Políticas Públicas, Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile.
Paredes, R. (1995a). Privatization and regulation in a less developed economy: The Chilean case. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Paredes, R. (1995b). Jurisprudencia de las comisiones antimonopolios de Chile. Estudios Públicos, (58), 227–317.
Peterson, S. (1995). Are drivers of air-bag-equipped cars more aggressive? A test of the offsetting behavior hypothesis. The Journal of Law and Economics, 38(2).
Rodríguez, A., & Williams, M. D. (1995). Economic liberalization and antitrust in Mexico. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Rosellón, J. (1995). Regulatory reform in Mexico's gas industry. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Schmalensee, R. (1995). What have we learned about privatization and regulatory reform? Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Serra, P. (1995). Competencia y regulación en el caso de Chile. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Stigler, G., & Friedland, C. (1962). What can regulators regulate?: The case of electricity. The Journal of Law and Economics, 5, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1086/466579
Stone, A., Levy, B., & Paredes, R. (1992). Public institutions and private transactions: The legal and regulatory environment for business transactions in Brazil and Chile (Policy Research Working Paper N.º WPS891). The World Bank.
The Economist. (1995, 11 de marzo). How to privatize.
Torres, C. (1995). Regulatory schemes and investment behavior in transmission of electricity: The case of Argentina. Revista de Análisis Económico, 10(2).
Waller, S. (1994). Neo-realism and the international harmonization of law: Lessons from antitrust. University of Kansas Law Review, 42.
Williamson, O. (1995). The economic institutions of capitalism. Free Press.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 1995 Ricardo Paredes, José M. Sánchez, Arturo Fernández
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Article usage
- ViewsTimes this article's page was opened since the journal started recording statistics. One person can visit more than once.
- 171
- DownloadsTimes the full text of this article (usually the PDF) was opened or downloaded.
- 168
All time, as recorded by the journal.
Last 2 years: 52 views, 103 downloads.
0.98 downloads per view (journal average 1.65).Downloads of the full text for every abstract view of this article, compared with the whole journal.
Explore the journal's metrics
