Advances in the Theory of Industrial Organization

Authors

  • Ricardo Paredes Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Santiago de Chile image/svg+xml

Keywords:

industrial organization, structure conduct performance, economic regulation, game theory, theory of the firm, microeconomics

Abstract

This article presents the basis of a recent theoretical approach to Industrial Organization with increasing influence on the regulatory institutions in the United States and Europe. The main conclusion is that the widely accepted (and older) approach of Structure Conduct Performance should be qualified in light of a number of advances coming out of the approach reviewed here.

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Published

1987-04-30

How to Cite

Paredes, R. (1987). Advances in the Theory of Industrial Organization. Economic Analysis Review, 2(1), 97–110. Retrieved from https://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/298

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