Analysis of the Antitrust Law in Chile
Keywords:
antitrust law, competition, Chile, regulation, social welfare, monopolyAbstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation to the way in which the Chilean Antitrust Law has been enforced, based on all cases considered by the Resolving Committee, between 1974 and 1987.
Through an analysis based on global indicators such as: number of cases, channels followed and sanctioned, the study concludes that the institutions who enforce the Antitrust Law, were not guided by the principle of social welfare maximization.
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Copyright (c) 1988 Ricardo Paredes
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