Recent Developments in Industrial Organization

Authors

  • Salvador Valdés Instituto de Economía, Universidad Católica de Chile

Keywords:

industrial organization, game theory, microeconomics, market structure, firm behaviour, industry interaction

Abstract

This note briefly surveys the state of the Industrial Organization Theory, emphasizing the importance of game theory in the analysis of industry interaction.

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References

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Alchian, A. (1984). Specificity, specialization, and coalitions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140(1).

Bain, J. (1959). Industrial organization. John Wiley & Sons.

Green, J., & Stokey, N. (1983). A comparison of tournaments and contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 349–364.

Harsanyi, J. (1968). Games with incomplete information played by «Bayesian» players, parts I-III. Management Science, 14, 159–182, 320–334, 486–502.

Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74–91.

Joskow, P. (1985). Vertical integration and long-term contracts: The case of coal-burning electric generating plants. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1(1), 33–79.

Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), 297–326. https://doi.org/10.1086/466922

Kreps, D., & Wilson, R. (1982). Sequential equilibria. Econometrica, 50(4), 863–894. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767

Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841–864. https://doi.org/10.1086/261010

Mason, E. (1939). Price and production policies of large-scale enterprise. American Economic Review, 29(1, Suplemento), 61–74.

Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286–295.

Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4(1), 25–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01766400

Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010

Stigler, G. (1964). A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), 44–61. https://doi.org/10.1086/258853

Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. Free Press.

Wilson, C. (1980). The nature of equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1), 108–130. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003403

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Published

1987-04-30

How to Cite

Valdés, S. (1987). Recent Developments in Industrial Organization. Economic Analysis Review, 2(1), 91–96. Retrieved from https://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/297

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 1 (1987)

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 1987 Salvador Valdés

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

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