Old Organizational Issues from a New Institutional Economics Perspective. Some Introductory Remarks
Keywords:
new institutional economics, economic methodology, organizational analysis, institutional reform, economic governanceAbstract
This introduction to the special issue on new institutional economics argues that the images of complex socio-economic realities conveyed by economic theories and reports depend heavily on the methodological foundations upon which those analyses are built, and on the specific procedures each research tradition follows in order to test and refine its explanatory contributions. Competing explanations coexist, all of them methodologically and epistemologically situated, and additional criteria are required whenever the task involves assessments and policy recommendations. Against that background, the invited editor presents the papers gathered in the issue, which revisit long-standing organizational questions —the limits of institutional reform, hybrid arrangements standing between market and hierarchy, and the reform of social care provision— from the perspective of new institutional economics.Downloads
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