Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption: An Empirical Verification

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-88702024000100059

Keywords:

Fiscal decentralization, corruption

Abstract

The relationship between fiscal decentralization and the extraction of income by private agents is a constant element in the debates on territorial institutional design. Theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship, and it has been little studied empirically. An econometric model is estimated for a panel of data from 73 developing countries for the years 1996-2019. In general, the evidence found regarding the role of spending decentralization in a lower perception of corruption is consistent. However, a decentralization of income is related to greater corruption. In this way, possible accountability systems appear independent of the generation of own resources and transfer systems are highlighted in the control of public spending.

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Author Biographies

Diego Enrique Pinilla, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Administrativas

Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Administrativas, Docente - Investigador.

Patricia Hernández-Medina, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Administrativas

Docente - investigadora - Carrera de Economía - Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Administrativas.

Gabriel Ramírez-Torrez, Universidad Nacional de Chimborazo, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Administrativas

Docente - investigador - Carrera de Economía - Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Administrativas.

References

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Published

2024-05-05

How to Cite

Pinilla, D. E., Hernández-Medina, P., & Ramírez-Torrez, G. (2024). Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption: An Empirical Verification. Economic Analysis Review, 39(1), 59–72. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-88702024000100059

Issue

Vol. 39 No. 1 (2024)

Section

Articles

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Copyright (c) 2024 Diego Enrique Pinilla, Patricia Hernández-Medina, Gabriel Ramírez-Torrez

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

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